Israel’s military has released its first official report detailing the missteps that led to its failures during Hamas’s attack on October 7, 2023, an event that ignited the ongoing Gaza war.
The report acknowledges that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) “failed in its mission to protect Israeli civilians.”
Spanning 19 pages, the report reiterates much of what is already known about the devastating attack, which resulted in the deaths of approximately 1,200 people and the abduction of 251 hostages by around 5,000 Hamas and other Palestinian militants who breached Israeli borders.
Although the report does not present groundbreaking revelations, it starkly outlines the military’s misjudgments regarding Hamas’s intent and capabilities. It highlights that the IDF perceived Gaza as a secondary security concern, prioritizing threats from Iran and Hezbollah. The report describes Israel’s stance on Gaza as “paradoxical,” noting that while Hamas was deemed illegitimate, no alternative governance plan was developed.
The military opted for a “conflict management” approach, assuming Hamas was neither seeking nor preparing for a large-scale war—an assumption reinforced by Hamas’s deception tactics.
Since 2018, intelligence indicating Hamas’s development of an ambitious attack strategy was dismissed as unrealistic or merely aspirational rather than a credible threat. However, in the months leading up to the attack, the Military Intelligence Directorate began reassessing this view, recognizing Hamas’s plans as concrete and actionable. Despite this shift, key military intelligence officials were not informed in time.
The report identifies a widespread sense of complacency within the IDF regarding Hamas’s threat and emphasizes that there was no thorough consideration of alternative scenarios. Over time, the gap between intelligence assessments and the actual situation on the ground widened significantly.
It also criticizes a decline in the military’s understanding of Hamas’s worldview, including its culture, religion, language, and history. The report calls for major reforms within the intelligence directorate, promoting intellectual openness, skepticism, learning, and constructive debate.
Additionally, the military’s reluctance to compromise valuable intelligence sources contributed to its failure to raise the alert level before the attack.
On October 7, the Gaza Division was “effectively defeated for several hours,” severely hampering its ability to comprehend and respond to the situation. While the Air Force reacted quickly, distinguishing between IDF personnel, civilians, and militants proved challenging. The report also notes instances where wounded soldiers were evacuated before civilians.
Israeli forces struggled for hours to regain control of areas near the Gaza border, taking days to fully clear them of attackers.
Following the report’s presentation, the outgoing IDF Chief of Staff, Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi, took full responsibility for the failures. “I embrace my responsibility. It is mine. I was the commander of the army on October 7, and I bear responsibility for everything that went wrong,” he stated in a video address.
Last month, Halevi announced his resignation, advocating for a commission of inquiry to conduct a broader investigation to prevent similar attacks in the future.
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has not accepted any responsibility for the events of October 7, arguing that a state inquiry should be postponed until after the war. Critics accuse him of evading accountability.
In response to the attack, Israel launched a military campaign in Gaza, where at least 48,365 people have been killed, according to Gaza’s Hamas-run health ministry.
